767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zaire: An Uncompensated Governmental Taking by Bartlett, David Foster
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 45 
Issue 1 Fall 1995 Article 6 
767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the 
Republic of Zaire: An Uncompensated Governmental Taking 
David Foster Bartlett 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
David F. Bartlett, 767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zaire: An 
Uncompensated Governmental Taking, 45 DePaul L. Rev. 165 (1995) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol45/iss1/6 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
767 THIRD AVENUE ASSOCIATES v. PERMANENT
MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE: AN
UNCOMPENSATED GOVERNMENTAL TAKING
INTRODUCTION
Diplomats enjoy many privileges and immunities which shield them
from penalties or punishment others receive under the law of foreign
states for the same actions.' Recent outrageous conduct by diplomats
has placed those privileges and immunities under close scrutiny by the
American public. 2 Never before, however, have diplomatic immuni-
1. The Vienna Convention outlines the privileges and immunities currently enjoyed by diplo-
mats. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S.
95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Articles 29, 31, and 32 of the Vienna Convention govern
the protection of diplomats who have violated the laws or customs of a receiving state. Article
29 proclaims that a diplomatic agent is inviolable and may not be arrested or'detained. Article
31 protects the diplomat from criminal prosecution in a receiving state and also protects the
diplomat from the civil and administrative jurisdiction in certain situations. Finally, Article 32
provides that a diplomat can be tried in a receiving state only if the diplomat's immunity is
expressly waived by the sending state.
2. For example, foreign governments have used the protection of diplomatic immunity and
the inviolability of the diplomatic pouch as a means to traffic illegal drugs into the United States.
See Diplomatic Immunity Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 7819 Before the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1978) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (discussing the use of
diplomatic pouches for smuggling illegal material through customs). The extent and size of such
drug trafficking operations is alarming. For example,
Four men were indicted... by a Federal grand jury on charges of conspiring since 1950
to import thousands of pounds of pure heroin into the United States through the use of
diplomatic couriers with diplomatic immunity. The defendants . . . allegedly ... used
Mauricio Rosal, a former Guatemalan Ambassador to Belgium, to bring the heroin
into this country.
U.S. Indicts Four as Members of Diplomatic Heroin Ring, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 5, 1962, at 11.
Diplomatic immunity has even been used by government agents to abduct and kidnap individ-
uals. See Leslie Shirin Farhangi, Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1517, 1525 (1986) (discussing incidents that illustrate abuses of diplomatic immunity). For
instance, Rome customs authorities realized that a large "diplomatic bag" destined for Cairo was
emitting moans. Id. at n.41 (citing E. SATOW, SATow's GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 117
(Lord Gore-Booth 5th ed. 1979)). The officials seized the bag and found that it contained a
drugged Israeli who had been kidnapped. Id. The bag was addressed to the foreign minister in
Cairo and had been specially fitted to contain a human body - complete with a small chair, a
helmet for the head, and metal clamps for the ankles and neck. Id. The bag had apparently
been well used. Id.
Diplomatic immunity has even been used as a defense to murder. To illustrate, in a recent
occurrence, charges brought against the grandson of the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington
for shooting an American citizen outside a nightclub were dismissed on the grounds of diplo-
matic immunity. Skeen v. Braz., 566 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1983).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ties extended to foreign sovereigns infringed upon the constitutional
rights of United States citizens as they did in the recent case, 767
Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Zaire.3
In 767 Third Avenue Associates, the plaintiff, a New York City land-
lord, sought to evict Zaire's Mission to the United States from its
rental premises when the Mission failed to meet its rental obligations. 4
To prevent the eviction, Zaire raised the defense of diplomatic immu-
nity.5 The Second Circuit accepted Zaire's defense and held that local
concepts of fairness, such as eviction when rent is not paid, must not
be invoked when they would upset international treaty provisions to
which the United States is a party.6 The immunities extended to the
Zairian Mission in 767 Third Avenue Associates dealt a major blow to
constitutionally protected property interests of United States citizens. 7
As a result of 767 Third Avenue Associates, American citizens' prop-
erty rights must succumb when such property rights conflict with the
United States' Government's decision to grant diplomatic immunity.8
This Note examines the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion
in 767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the Republic
of Zaire by exploring the inherent conflict between 767 Third Avenue
Associates' property rights under American law and the diplomatic
privileges accorded the Zairian Mission under international law. In
this regard, this Note first details the property rights of American citi-
zens. The Note then discusses the government's obligation, under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution, to compensate property owners when their land is appropri-
ated for a public purpose. Next, this Note traces the history of
diplomatic immunity. In particular, this Note addresses the concept of
mission inviolability and the significance of the Vienna Convention.
After providing the above background, the Note summarizes the Sec-
ond Circuit's opinion in 767 Third Avenue Associates. Then, the Note
analyzes the court's opinion, highlighting the tension between the
rights of 767 Third Avenue Associates and those of the Mission, and
discusses the impact of the court's decision. This Note concludes that,
3. 988 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 74 (1993).
4. Id. at 296.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. For a discussion of the property rights of United States citizens, see infra notes 9-35 and
accompanying text.
8. See 767 Third Avenue Assocs., 988 F.2d at 296 (asserting that "[e]nforcement of an owner's
common law right to obtain possession of its premises upon the tenant's non-payment of rent
may not override an established rule of international law").
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at a minimum, the United States Government must compensate fu-
ture landlords whose property rights are subordinated to the rights of
a foreign sovereign in the name of diplomatic immunity.
I. BACKGROUND
This section begins by tracing the history of the right to own prop-
erty under United States law and the scope of the government's obli-
gation to compensate property owners under the Takings Clause. The
section concludes by presenting a brief history of diplomatic immu-
nity, including the doctrine of mission inviolability and the Vienna
Convention.
A. Property Rights of American Citizens
The right to own property is a fundamental right conferred upon
every United States citizen.9 This right has been described as a natu-
ral, inherent, inalienable right which predates the Constitution and is
insusceptible to legislative restriction. 10 For example, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has stated that the "liberty of the person and the right
to the control of one's own property are very sacred rights which
should not be taken away or withheld except for very urgent rea-
sons."" Similarly, in Grubel v. MacLaughlin12 the court asserted that
"[t]he right of every owner of property to use [his property] in his own
way and for his own purposes existed before the adoption of the Con-
stitution and is guaranteed by that instrument."'1 3 The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - which prohibits any state
from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law - protects landowners from state infringement upon
their property rights.14
9. See, e.g., Culp v. United States, 131 F.2d 93,98 (8th Cir. 1942) ("The right to the enjoyment
of life and liberty and the right to acquire and possess property are fundamental rights of the
citizens of the several states and are not dependent upon the Constitution of the United States
or the Federal Government for their existence.").
10. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,416 (1922) (holding unconstitutional a
state regulation that went "beyond any of the cases decided by [the Supreme C]ourt").
11. In re Colliton, 164 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Wis. 1969) (quoting Guardianship of Reed, 182 N.W.
329, 330 (Wis. 1921)).
12. 286 F. Supp. 24 (V.I. 1968).
13. Id. at 27.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See, e.g., Culp v. United States, 131 F.2d 93, 97 (8th Cir.
1942) (recognizing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any
state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
furnishes "an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental
rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society").
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This governmental duty to preserve United States citizens' property
rights has been characterized by the Texas Supreme Court as one of
the most important functions of government.' 5 Likewise, the New
York Court of Appeals emphasized the importance and extent of
property rights in Headley v. City of Rochester,16 concluding that legis-
lation deprives a person of his property rights when it prevents him
from doing an act which he desires to do or diminishes the enjoyment
or profit which he would otherwise derive from his property. 17 Re-
flecting a similar view, the Second Circuit held in Fox Film Corp. v.
Trumbull18 that "[a] law which deprives the owner of property of the
power to make proper contracts respecting it, and to lease it, is obnox-
ious and invalid."'19 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has
held that a landowner's property rights include the right to use, lease,
and dispose of his land for any lawful purpose.20 This well-recognized
principal of protecting property rights is reflected in landlord-tenant
law, which has traditionally supported a landlord's property rights by
affording him remedies for a tenant's breach of a rental contract.2 1
B. Compensation for Governmental Taking of Property
Beyond the protections against private infringement, the Constitu-
tion also shields individuals' property from unjust governmental intru-
sion. This protection is accomplished by the Takings Clause, which
requires the government to pay just compensation to a landowner
whenever private property is taken for public benefit. In this context,
" '[p]roperty' consists, not in the thing said to be owned, but in the
right to dominion over it, control of its use, and disposition .... [The
property owner's] right to compensation for that part is a natural
right, protected by express constitutional provisions. '2 2 One such ex-
15. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977).
16. 5 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1936).
17. Id. at 201.
18. 7 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1925).
19. Id. at 719.
20. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 215 (1923). See also Buchannan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60, 74 (1917) ("Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person's acquisi-
tions without control or diminution save by the law of the land.").
21. For example, in Arkansas, "[a]ny person who shall rent any dwelling house, or other
building or any land.... and ... shall refuse or fail to pay the rent therefor, when due, according
to contract, shall at once forfeit all right to longer occupy said dwelling house or other building
or land." Poole v. Ark., 428 S.W.2d 628, 629-30 (Ark. 1968) (quoting ARK. CODE AN. § 50-
523).
22. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Colo., 193 P. 726, 728
(Colo. 1920). The court further stated that
The right of a person or corporation, whose property is taken for public use, to com-
pensation therefor, is guaranteed by both the state and the federal Constitutions. Such
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plicit constitutional provision is the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution which provides that "private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation. '23 Accordingly,
the established rule is that where, in the exercise of its power of emi-
nent domain, the government interferes with a property owner's rights
to such an extent as to constitute a taking, such interference carries
with it a concomitant promise under the Fifth Amendment to pay that
property owner "just compensation. '24 Just compensation consists of
right, however, exists regardless of constitutional provisions. It is a settled principle of
universal law, reaching back of all constitutional provisions, that the right to compensa-
tion is an incident to the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Idt See generally 63A AM. JUR. 2d Property § 1 (1984) (stating that the Constitution does not
create property interests; rather independent sources such as state law determine the scope of
property rights).
23. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. As is evident from the express language of the Takings Clause, the
Supreme Court has noted that this provision does not absolutely prohibit the government from
taking private property for public use, but rather it places a condition on the government's abil-
ity to exercise such power:
[T]he Amendment ... is designed not to limit the governmental interference with prop-
erty rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper
interference amounting to a taking. Thus, government action that works a taking of
property rights necessarily implicates the "constitutional obligation to pay just
compensation."
First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, Cal., 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (quot-
ing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
24. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473 (1973)
(reiterating that the Fifth Amendment requires that private property not be taken for public use
without "just compensation"). The power of eminent domain, which has been described as "an
inseparable attribute of sovereignty - an inherent power founded on the primary duty of gov-
ernment to serve the common need and advance the general welfare" gives states the ability to
convert private property to public use. Bergen County Sewer Auth. v. Borough of Little Ferry,
76 A.2d 680, 681 (N.J. 1950).
In San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued
that claims for just compensation are grounded in the Constitution itself. 450 U.S. 621, 654-55
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan explained his argument as follows:
"The suits were based on the right to recover just compensation for property taken by
the United States for public use in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. That
right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that condemnation proceedings
were not instituted and that the right was asserted in suits by the owners did not change
the essential nature of the claim. The form of remedy did not qualify the right. It
rested upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary. A prom-
ise to pay was not necessary. Such a promise was implied because of the duty to pay
imposed by the Amendment." The suits were thus founded upon the Constitution of
the United States.
Id. (quoting Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933)).
In addition, if a landowner believes that the government has effected a taking of his property
and the government does not bring a formal condemnation action, the landowner may institute
an "inverse condemnation" action. The inverse condemnation action seeks a judicial declaration
that the landowner's property has been taken by the government. First Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, Cal., 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) ("We have recognized that a
landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as a result of 'the self-executing
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the full monetary equivalent of the property taken.25 In other words,
the owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as he would
have been in if his property had not been subject to the governmental
taking.26 Such compensation consists of the fair market value of the
property at the time of the taking.27 The fair market value of property
is measured by "what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing
seller."28
While certain restrictions may be placed on private property with-
out constituting a taking on the part of the government, the Supreme
Court has stated that regulations which go "too far" will be recognized
as a governmental taking.29 It is not essential, therefore, that the gov-
ernment physically appropriate the property for its own use for a tak-
ing to occur.30 To assist courts in deciding whether a taking has
resulted, in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. ,3 1 the
Supreme Court set forth three factors relevant in analyzing the degree
of interference with property owners' rights.32 These factors include:
1) the extent to which the regulation interferes with the landowner's
investment-backed expectations, 2) the economic impact of the regu-
lation on the landowner, and 3) the character of the governmental
action. 33
In sum, the compensation requirement is designed to protect the
private property interests of all American citizens. The Supreme
Court characterized this policy against uncompensated takings as a
means by which "to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole. ' 34 Diplomatic Immunity is one such
character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation' ") (quoting United States
v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)).
25. Almota Farmers, 409 U.S. at 473.
26. Id. at 473-74.
27. Id. at 474.
28. Id.
29. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
30. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) (stating
that any governmental action that denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is
a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment); Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415
(articulating the "general rule ... that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if the
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking"); Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United States, 420
F.2d 1386, 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (noting that a taking can occur simply when the government by its
action deprives the owner of all or most of his interest in his property).
31. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
32. Id. at 224.
33. Id. at 224-25.
34. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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"public burden" which should not be borne by private individuals
alone without just governmental compensation.
C. Diplomatic Immunity: Mission Inviolability and
the Vienna Convention
The United States Department of State Protocol characterizes dip-
lomatic immunity as "a principle of international law [that] is broadly
defined as the freedom from local jurisdiction accorded duly accred-
ited diplomatic agents and members of their immediate household. ' 35
The concept of diplomatic immunity can be traced back to the time of
primitive man.36 As one commentator has observed: "[T]he more
fundamental rules of diplomatic law - that the person of the ambas-
sador is inviolable and that a special protection must be given to the
messages which he sends and receives from his sovereign - have ex-
isted from time immemorial among civilized states. ' 37 Moreover, the
records of the early kingdoms of the Middle East, India, and China
discuss rudimentary diplomatic activity.38 For instance, diplomatic re-
lations existed between Egypt and Turkey dating as far back as 1271
B.C.39 Similarly, the ancient Greeks practiced diplomatic relations,40
as did societies in biblical times.41
35. GRANT V. MCCLANAHAN, DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, PROBLEMS 1
(1989) (referring to a formulation of diplomatic immunity propounded in a United States De-
partment of State Office of Protocol paper in 1981).
36. Id. at 18. Dr. Ragnar, a specialist in diplomacy, studied the anthropological evidence of
existing primitive people at this elemental level of social development. Id. He concluded that
primitive societies develop customary procedures for starting wars, making peace, discussing
trade, and sending intercommunity messages. Id. To facilitate these activities, the individuals
who conduct intercommunity business are entitled to free movement and personal immunity. Id.
37. Farhangi, supra note 2, at 1518 n.8 (quoting E. SATOW, SATOW's GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC
PRACTICE 106 (Lord Gore-Booth 5th ed. 1979)).
38. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 35, at 19.
39. Id. In 1937, when Egypt was admitted into the League of Nations, the Turkish Delegation
discussed, in its welcoming speech, the historical background of diplomatic relations between
Egypt and Turkey. Id. For example, text discussing the treaty of peace and alliance between
Hittite King Hattushilish III and Pharaoh Rameses II about 1271 B.C. was found in the Hittite
language in Turkey and in hieroglyphics on the walls of an Egyptian temple at Luxor. Id.
40. Id. at 21. The Greek states, in 750-350 B.C., consistently fought one another and many
times formed loose leagues and temporary alliances to help defend against their enemies. Id.
Ambassadors sent by the states to promote these alliances or to make peace were accorded
immunity and were regarded as under the protection of Zeus. Id. Any molestation of them
therefore was considered a grave offense against the gods and the city that sent them. Id.
41. Id. at 18-22. See also ABBA EBAN, THE NEW DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IN
THE MODERN AGE 335 (1983) ("[T]here is a great deal of political and military diplomacy in the
biblical narrative .... [K]ings, queens, generals and other dignitaries are portrayed as sending
messengers to adversaries in the region, usually with such unwelcome tidings that they would
need every ounce of immunity that they could get.").
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The modern form of diplomatic immunity began to take shape dur-
ing the Renaissance period with the establishment of resident ambas-
sadors.42 A resident ambassador is defined as "a regularly accredited
envoy with full diplomatic status sent ... to remain at his post until
recalled, in general charge of the interests of his principal. '43 By 1500,
the major European powers were exchanging residential ambassadors
between their courts.44 It is believed that the use of residential ambas-
sadors originated in Italy and then spread throughout Europe.45 The
international community regarded privileges and immunities for resi-
dent ambassadors as a novel concept in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, and the limits of such immunities were fiercely debated.
46
Diplomatic immunity arose as an extension of sovereign immu-
nity.47 Dealings with other countries, before the days of interstate
commerce, were conducted through a sovereign's accredited repre-
sentatives. 48 It was deemed likely that the representatives would at
some time, as a natural result of their presence in the foreign state,
become involved in matters susceptible to litigation. 49 Because they
represented the sovereign, such individuals were considered diplo-
matic agents and were accorded the same immunity as the sovereign
himself.50
42. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 35, at 25.
43. Id. (quoting GARRETT MATrINoLY, RENAISSANCE DIPLOMACY 64 (1955)).
44. Id. at 26.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 26-27 (citing GARR Tr MATTINGLY, RENAISSANCE DIPLOMACY 278-79 (1955)).
Sovereigns were usually anxious to preserve diplomatic contacts, and consequently tol-
erant of the incidental frictions which such contacts entailed. At the same time the
growing embassy staffs, groups of specially privileged foreigners resident among popu-
lations quick to suspect them of misbehavior and evil intentions, multiplied the oppor-
tunities for friction. Embassy staffs ranged from grave secretaries and young aristocrats
through tough couriers and lackeys .... They were not always carefully selected ....
As such groups began to realize that their immunity from local prosecution could be
extended by the insistence of the ambassador ... it is not surprising that municipal
authorities and city mobs responded to their provocations with violence. Embassy ser-
vants were attacked in the streets. Embassy precincts were forcibly invaded by local
officers. Now and then some ambassador's residence stood for days what almost
amounted to a siege.
Id.
47. See CHARLES LEwis, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNrrY 98 (1980) ("The inviolability, in
theory, of the herald and the flag of truce had been recognized as a practical necessity from
earliest times, but, as a matter law, it was the consideration that the sovereign's dignity and
independence must be preserved that gave protection to his diplomatic agents.").
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. ("[T]he privilege of a public minister is to have his person sacred and free from arrests,
not on his own account, but on account of those he represents .. . . The foundation of this
privilege is for the sake of the prince by whom an ambassador is sent.").
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1. The Origin, Definition and Current Interpretation of Mission
Inviolability
One of the principle immunities extended to foreign diplomats is
mission inviolability. The doctrine of mission inviolability, as formu-
lated by the Vienna Convention, guarantees diplomats of a sending
state that the receiving state's agents will not enter their mission
premises without the consent of the mission head.5' In addition, mis-
sion inviolability provides the mission premises and any personal
property located thereon with immunity from search or seizure.5 2 In
767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Zaire, Zaire invoked mission inviolability as a defense to the eviction
action brought by the partnership, thus creating the conflict which was
the focus of the Second Circuit's opinion in that case.53
The inviolability of dignitaries has been recognized as far back as
the roots of diplomacy itself.5 4 In ancient India, the importance of
diplomatic inviolability was addressed in Kautilya's Artha-Sastra, a
fourth-century piece on foreign relations which states that
"[m]essengers are the mouth-pieces of Kings ... hence messengers
who, in the face of weapons raised against them, have to express their
mission as exactly as they are entrusted . . . do not . . . deserve
death."55
The generally recognized rule of mission inviolability was accepted
and applied in the United States, over two hundred years ago, in the
early case of Respublica v. de Longchamps.56 In Longchamps, the ac-
cused, an American citizen, was charged with entering the premises of
the French Legation, located in Pennsylvania, and threatening the
French Secretary.5 7 The Court found the defendant guilty and ex-
plained that entering the mission without permission was "an infrac-
tion of the law of nations" which was part of the law of
51. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 35, at 50 (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 1, 23 U.S.T. at
3237-38, 500 U.N.T.S. at 106, 108).
52. Id. (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 1, 23 U.S.T. at 3237-38, 500 U.N.T.S. at 106,
108).
53. See infra notes 111-123 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's analysis of
the impact of mission inviolability on 767 Third Avenue Associates' property rights).
54. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 35, at 23 (explaining that "[i]n ancient India, kings and
princes sent envoys to one another and had at least tenuous diplomatic relations with the Helle-
nistic kingdoms formed out of Alexander's brief empire .... Envoys were accorded immunities
and personal inviolability").
55. Id. (quoting G.V.G. KRISHNAMURTY, MODERN DIPLOMACY: DIALECrIcS AND DIMEN-
SIONs 49 (1980)).
56. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784).
57. Id. at 114.
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Pennsylvania. 58 The Court ruled that the person of a public minister
was "sacred and inviolable" - the same reasoning which established
the inviolability of a minister was to be applied to "secure the inviola-
bility of his house" which was to be "defended from all outrage. ' 59
After Respublica v. de Longchamps, Congress passed the Diplo-
matic Relations Act of 1790 which made it an offense to "offer vio-
lence" to an ambassador or other public minister or any of their
domestic servants, or for distraint, seizure or attachment of their
goods, and imposed a penalty on any party issuing or executing any
such process.60 Section 26 of the 1790 statute enforced the inviolabil-
ity of diplomats by threatening to impose criminal sanctions upon
those who processed wrongful suits against diplomats. 61
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, two principles, "extra-
territoriality" and "representation, formed the basis for diplomatic im-
munity."62 Under the exterritoriality theory, foreign premises were
considered the territory of the sending state, notwithstanding that
they were actually located in the receiving state. 63 Thus, the exterrito-
riality doctrine created a legal fiction which accorded a diplomat who
resided in such premises immunity because he was "legally outside the
territory of the host state." 64 The second principle was the theory of
representation. 65 Under this theory, the diplomat " 'personifies his
sovereign whose dignity does not permit subjugation to the jurisdic-
tion of a foreign sovereign' "; an insult to the ambassador was consid-
58. Id.
59. Id. The Court stated that the minister's house was "under a peculiar protection of the
laws; to invade its freedom is a crime against the state and all other nations." Id.
60. Diplomatic Relations Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 117-18.
61. Id. at ch. 9, § 26, 1 Stat. 118, This section provided that
in case any person or persons shall sue forth or prosecute any such writ or process, such
persons or persons, and all attorneys or solicitors prosecuting or soliciting in such case,
and all officers executing any such writ or process, being thereof convicted, shall be
deemed violators of the laws of nations, and disturbers of the public repose, and impris-
oned not exceeding three years, and fined at the discretion of the court.
Id. The first five sections of the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 254 (a) - (d)
(1988), repealed the old 1790 law.
62. D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 261-62 (2d. ed. 1976). See also Farhangi, supra note
2, at 1520 (defining "exterritoriality" as the "approach to diplomatic immunity [which] adopts
the legal fiction that a diplomat is always on the soil of her native country," and explaining
"representation" as a "traditional diplomatic practice, [under which] a diplomatic envoy personi-
fies the sovereign she represents") (footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 261.
64. William F. Marmon, Jr., The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 and Its Consequences, 19
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ered an insult to the dignity of the sovereign.66 The current theory
supporting diplomatic immunity is "functional necessity. ' 67 This prin-
ciple recognizes the practical necessity of diplomatic immunity: a dip-
lomat needs enough immunity to accomplish his job. 68 In particular,
the doctrine of functional necessity was the principle underlying the
Vienna Convention.
2. The Impact of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
Any discussion of contemporary diplomatic relations must consider
the influence of the Vienna Convention.69 The Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations was signed on April 18, 1961, and is one of the
most universally accepted sources of international law.70 Upon ratifi-
cation by the United States on December 13, 1972, the Vienna Con-
vention became enforceable. 71 It consists of fifty-three articles, the
purpose of which is to guarantee satisfactory completion of diplomatic
functions. 72 The Convention adopted the concept of diplomatic func-
66. Id. (quoting M. OGDON, JURIDICAL BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 105 (1936)). Chief
Justice Marshall addressed the representation theory in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon: "The
assent of the sovereign to the very important and extensive exemptions from territorial jurisdic-
tion which are admitted to attach to foreign ministers is implied from the consideration that,
without such exemption, every sovereign would hazard his own dignity by employing a public
minister abroad." 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 138-39 (1812).
67. Marmon, supra note 64, at 132.
68. Id. The functional necessity approach justifies immunity on the grounds that diplomats
could not fulfill their diplomatic functions without such privileges: "If diplomats were liable to
ordinary legal and political interference from the state or other individuals, they would be de-
pendent on the good will of the receiving state. Considerations of safety and comfort might
materially hamper the exercise of their functions." Farhangi, supra note 2, at 1521.
69. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. See Ernest L. Kerley,
Some Aspects of the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 438 (Leo Gross ed., 1969) (stating that the Vienna
Convention, unlike prior similar international conferences, produced creditable formulations of
international law). The United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities
met at the Neue Hofburg in Vienna from March 2 to April 14, 1961. Id. The General Assembly
passed Resolution 1450 (XIV) which memorialized the Assembly's decision to convene an inter-
national conference of diplomats to consider the question of diplomatic intercourse and immuni-
ties. Id. The resolution invited "all States Members of the United Nations, States members of
the specialized agencies ... and intergovernmental organizations" to the conference. Id.
70. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 35, at 44 (recognizing that the Vienna Convention is the
starting point for any discussion of contemporary diplomatic privileges and immunities); see also
Farhangi, supra note 2, at 1521 (acknowledging that the Vienna Convention governs every aspect
of diplomatic immunity); Marmon, supra note 64, at 137 n.31 (stating that the Vienna Conven-
tion was the first comprehensive, truly international convention on diplomatic immunities).
71. GREIO, supra note 62, at 254.
72. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 35, at 45. The functions of a diplomatic mission consist, inter
alia of
1) representing the sending State in the receiving State; 2) protecting in the receiving
State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted
by international law; 3) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State; 4)
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tional necessity in its preamble, a major component of which is mis-
sion inviolability.73
Article 22 of the Convention explains "mission inviolability" as
follows:
1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of
the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of
the head of the mission.
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate
steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or
damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission
or impairment of its dignity.
3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property
thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune
from search, requisition, attachment or execution. 74
Several nations, including the United States, proposed Amend-
ments to Article 22 which sought to limit the extent of mission inviola-
bility.75 For example, many nations recommended restricting the
effect of paragraph one of Article 22 in cases of public emergency.76
In particular, Mexico proposed a provision which required "the head
of mission [to] co-operate with local authorities in case of fire, epi-
demic or other extreme emergency. ' 77 Ireland and Japan jointly pro-
posed an alternate amendment to this paragraph, which stated that
mission inviolability should not preclude a receiving state from "tak-
ing measures essential for the protection of life and property in excep-
tional circumstances of public emergency or danger. ' 78 Both of the
foregoing amendments were subsequently withdrawn.79 By contrast,
the United States proposed that the mission head's consent to entry
should be presumed in cases of public emergency or exceptional dan-
ger "when immediate entry is necessary to protect life and prop-
ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State,
and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State; and 5) promoting
friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing
their economic, cultural and scientific relations.
Id. at 48.
73. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, 23 U.S.T. at 3230, 500 U.N.T.S. at 96. The preamble to
the Vienna Convention states that the purpose of granting diplomatic immunity is "not to bene-
fit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as
representing States." Id.
74. Id., 23 U.S.T. at 3237-38, 500 U.N.T.S. at 106, 108.
75. See Kerley, supra note 69, at 452 (discussing amendments proposed by Japan, Ireland, and
Mexico).
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting U.N. Doc. A/CONF.20/C.1/L. 129 (1961)).
78. Id. (citing U.N. Doc. A/CONF.20/C.1/L. 163 (1961)).
79. Kerley, supra note 69, at 452-53.
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erty. '' 80 In addition, the Indian contingency suggested creating an
exception to mission inviolability which granted landlords a right of
periodic inspection of the leased premises.81
Although none of the above suggested amendments were adopted,
the Commission commented that a sending state possesses a moral
duty to cooperate with the receiving state.82 Similarly, the United
States, in its comments to the Commission, proclaimed that "[t]he
United States Government is of the view that international law does
not absolutely preclude the requisition of such property or its taking
by exercise of right of eminent domain. This right, of course, could
only be exercised under very limited circumstances. ' 83 Today, the Vi-
enna Convention, which sets forth a liberal interpretation of mission
inviolability, contains one of the most widely-accepted formulations of
diplomatic immunity, 84 and was the primary authority upon which the
court relied in 767 Third Avenue Associates.
II. SUBJECT OPINION: 767 THIRD A VENUE ASSOCIATES V.
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE8 5
In 767 Third Avenue Associates, the plaintiffs consisted of a partner-
ship, 767 Third Avenue Associates, which owned a building at that
address in New York City, and Sage Realty Corporation, the manag-
ing general agent for the building (collectively, 767 Third Avenue As-
sociates).8 6 On May 19, 1982, Sage Realty, as agent for 767 Third
Avenue Associates, entered into a written lease with the Mission of
Zaire for a ten year period beginning on June 21, 1982, for the entire
25th floor of the building.8 7 After about five years, Sage Realty began
to have difficulty collecting rent from the Mission.88 As a result,
plaintiffs filed two lawsuits. The first lawsuit commenced in 1987,
80. Id. at 453. Dr. Amado expressed the same sentiments at the International Law Commis-
sion sessions in 1958 when he stated that "it was impossible to make provision for every contin-
gency in the draft. It was hardly conceivable that a head of a mission would fail to cooperate
with the authorities in an emergency." Id. (quoting 1 INT'L LAW COMM'N Y.B. (1958) 129-130
U.N. Doc. A/Cn.4/SER.A/1958)). Dr. Amado was specifically opposed to the idea of a body of
international lawyers dictating to heads of missions what their elementary duties as human be-
ings were. Id.
81. See id. (explaining that the Indian amendment was criticized as being more appropriate as
a lease provision rather than as a principle of international law).
82. Id. at 453-54 (citing Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 17-18, U.N. Doc. A/3859 (1958)).
83. Id. at 454 (quoting U.N. GOAR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/4164 (1958)).
84. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 35, at 44.
85. 988 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 74 (1993).




when 767 Third Avenue Associates brought an action against the Mis-
sion after it had failed to make rental payments. 89 On August 22,
1989, the trial court awarded 767 Third Avenue Associates possession
of the premises and $244,157.49 in damages. 90 After the August judg-
ment, the Mission paid the full amount of damages, and 767 Third
Avenue Associates allowed the Mission to remain in possession of the
property as a month-to-month tenant under an oral agreement.91
In 1991, the Mission again defaulted in its rental payments. 92 On
April 20 of that year, 767 Third Avenue Associates notified the Mis-
sion that they were terminating the Mission's month-to-month ten-
ancy.93 When Zaire refused to vacate the premises, 767 Third Avenue
Associates commenced a second action against the Mission to recover
damages and to evict Zaire.94 The district court granted the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment on November 14, 1991. 95 The court
awarded the partnership $387,154.72 in damages through October 31,
1991, and additional damages of $832.19 for every day, beginning No-
vember 1, 1991, that the Mission continued to occupy the premises.96
The court also ordered the Mission to vacate the premises.97 Finally,
the court authorized the United States Marshalls to remove the Mis-
sion if the Mission refused to remove its personal property.98
Although the court did not specify the date by which the Mission
was to vacate its rental premises, the court issued a supplemental or-
der on January 15, 1992, which imposed a January 31, 1992, deadline
for the Mission to vacate.99 The Mission sought a stay of the supple-
mental order pending appeal. 100 The trial court granted a temporary
stay to allow the parties to more fully brief the issue of diplomatic
immunity, but denied Zaire's request for a stay pending appeal.' 0
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. At the time the Mission became a month-to-month tenant, the rental payments for the










101. Id. The trial court rejected Zaire's claim of irreparable injury in the absence of a stay,
pointing out that the premises were not unique and despite the abundant notice, Zaire had not
attempted to locate nor arrange any alternative housing. Id.
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The court ultimately granted a limited stay until April 20, 1992, to
allow the Mission time to vacate the premises in an orderly manner.102
The trial court determined that neither the various treaties ratified
by the United States nor the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA)10 3 supported the defendant's contention that a private land-
lord could be compelled to host a non-paying tenant ad infinitum, sim-
ply because that tenant is a foreign mission.104 In this regard, the fact
that the United States Government refused to ensure the partner-
ship's ability to collect the Mission's rent played an important role in
the court's decision. 10 5 Consequently, the district court concluded
that it would be inequitable to impose the entire burden of the execu-
tive branch's asserted foreign policy objectives on the shoulders of a
single private landlord.' °6
In reversing the trial court's ruling, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals determined that "[t]he inviolability of a United Nations mission
under international and United States law precludes the forcible evic-
tion of the Mission."'01 7 The appellate court explained that treaties,
like statutes, bind the federal courts.10 8 While Congress aimed to per-
mit courts to make sovereign immunity determinations under the
FSIA, according to the Second Circuit, the FSIA expressly provides
that it operates subject to existing international agreements to which
the United States is a party.' °9 Thus, the appellate court refused to
accept the proposition that the FSIA alters the diplomatic protections
recognized under international treaties." 0
Although the court recognized that several treaties govern diplo-
matic relations, it focused primarily on the Vienna Convention, which
102. Id. The court did not want to force a "hasty eviction" because such haste might compro-
mise the confidentiality of the Mission's papers located on the premises. Id. Moreover, the
parties finally agreed that the district court's eviction order be stayed pending appeal due to
numerous meetings among U.S. officials, the United Nations Legal Counsel, and Zaire's Charge
d'Affaires. Id. at 296-97. As a result of these meetings, the United States State Department
issued an ultimatum to Zaire demanding the Republic to immediately pay its back rent in full or
the United States would deport two Zairian officials and their families who resided at the Mis-
sion. Id. Consequently, Zaire paid its rental arrearages. Id. at 297.
103. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
104. 767 Third Avenue Assocs. v. Permanent Mission of the Rep. of Zaire, 787 F. Supp. 389,
395 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
105. Id. at 396-97.
106. Id. at 396. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would "raise a serious issue as to
whether Plaintiffs had been subjected to an unconstitutional 'taking' under the Fifth Amend-
ment." Id.
107. 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Permanent Mission of the Rep. of Zaire, 988 F.2d 295, 297 (2d





directly addresses the issue of mission inviolability."' In examining
the impact of the Vienna Convention upon the case before it, the
court asserted that the drafters of the Convention expressly intended
that missions enjoy broad inviolability under Article 22.112 The court
found support for its assertion in the fact that many nations involved
in drafting the Vienna Convention proposed exceptions to mission in-
violability, none of which were incorporated into the final docu-
ment.113 The court further supported its broad interpretation of
mission inviolability by quoting the commentary to the draft of Article
22, which stated that "the receiving State is obliged to prevent its
agents from entering the premises for any official act whatsoever.""l14
Moreover, the court pointed out that the United States has never
before disregarded the complete inviolability of missions and has
never entered a mission's premises without consent - even in ex-
treme situations such as bomb threats or health risks. 115 The court
thus concluded that the extent of mission inviolability "could [not] be
stated more plainly," and that because no evidence of contrary inter-
pretations existed, the federal courts must defer to the express lan-
guage of Article 22.116
Beyond the plain language of Article 22, the Second Circuit claimed
that if mission inviolability was not honored and Zaire's mission was
evicted, American diplomats abroad may likewise be denied protec-
tion of their lives and property. 117 The court stated: "That possibility
weighs so heavily on the scales of justice that it mitigates against en-
forcement of the landlord's right to obtain possession of its property
for rental arrears. 11 8 Therefore, the Second Circuit held that United
States officials may not enter a mission to evict foreign diplomats, af-
firming the lower court's judgment awarding plaintiffs monetary dam-
ages and reversing the lower court's eviction order." 9 In so holding,
111. See id. at 298 (noting that numerous other treaties, including the United Nations Charter,
the Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of America Regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations speak to the issue of diplomatic immunity).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 298-99. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed
exceptions to mission inviolability for emergency situations).
114. Id. at 299 (quoting Report of the International Law Commission, Diplomatic Intercourse
and Immunities, U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 137, U.N. Doc. A/3623 (1957)).
115. See id. at 301 (remarking that after the Soviet mission to the U.N. was bombed in 1979,
FBI agents and local police officers were all refused admission into the Mission until the Soviets
consented to the entry of certain officers).
116. Id. at 299.
117. Id. at 301.
118. Id. at 296.
119. Id. at 299, 303.
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the Second Circuit dismissed the district court's conclusion that, under
the Vienna Convention, the purpose of mission inviolability is to pre-
vent sudden invasions. 120
The appellate court indicated that it was aware of the negative pol-
icy implications of its decision and suggested that, although reforming
the Vienna Convention may well be a valid objective, the federal
courts were an inappropriate forum for such change. 121 Absent such
legislative reform, the court suggested two alternatives to prevent fu-
ture litigation in similar matters. First, the court recommended in-
creased involvement by the State Department in resolving such
disputes. 122 Second, the court suggested that landlords, in negotiating
future leases with foreign missions, could request an advance waiver
of inviolability or demand additional security.123
III. ANALYSIS
The 767 Third Avenue Associates court was confronted with a seri-
ous conflict. Resolution of this conflict forced the Second Circuit to
balance the fundamental property rights accorded United States citi-
zens against the policy dictates of a significant international treaty, the
Vienna Convention. Ultimately, the court held that Zaire could not
be evicted from its mission for nonpayment of rent, thus elevating the
rights of foreign diplomats over those of American private property
owners. As discussed above in Part II.B., when the government inter-
feres with a private property owner's use and enjoyment of his land to
the extent of effecting a taking, the Constitution commands the gov-
ernment to pay that property owner just compensation. Thus, so long
as the Vienna Convention's liberal policy of mission inviolability
120. Id. at 301. Contrary to the appellate court, the district court found that "[n]othing in the
commentary to the draft articles suggests that fears about 'mob violence' and 'unannounced
seizures' were ever the main concerns underlying diplomatic immunity." Id.
121. Id. at 302. The court stated that Congress "is the branch of government best suited to
address the full array of concerns involved in altering the Vienna Convention." Id. The court
remarked that the legislature had enacted the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1878 to address some
of the more egregious abuses of diplomatic privilege. Id. The Act, stated the court, empowers
the President to, among other things, limit mission inviolability. Id. The court found it signifi-
cant that no President has ever exercised such power. Id. Therefore, the court believed any
reform of the Vienna Convention is appropriately left to Congress and not the executive or the
judiciary branches. Id. at 302-03.
122. Id. at 303. The court noted that "to date, diplomatic efforts and pressure have proven
extraordinarily successful at getting Zaire to pay the judgment for its back rent. The State De-
partment has diligently pursued the matter on behalf of plaintiffs and went so far as to demand
the expulsion of several Zairian diplomats if the judgment was not paid by a certain deadline."
Id.
123. Id. The court contemplated that, as a result of increased risk, "[tlhe market rate for rent
to such tenants might itself rise to incorporate risks posed by mission inviolability." Id.
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stands to prevent a foreign Mission from being evicted from its rental
premises for nonpayment of rent, the United States Government must
compensate affected landlords under the Takings Clause for loss of
dominion over their property.
A. The Broad Formulation of Mission Inviolability under the
Vienna Convention Supports the Second Circuit's Holding
The district court correctly asserted that the doctrine of mission in-
violability principally seeks to prevent sudden invasions upon foreign
missions. To effectuate this goal, the Vienna Convention adopted a
sweeping interpretation of mission inviolability into Article 22 which
expressly provides that under no circumstances is a mission to be en-
tered without the consent of the mission head. Moreover, the com-
mentary to Article 22 indicates that mission inviolability means that
"the receiving State is obliged to prevent its agents from entering the
premises for any official act whatsoever.' 12 4 Arguably, the rejected
amendments proposing to limit mission inviolability in emergency sit-
uations would not have compromised the goal of preventing sudden
invasions of foreign missions.125 The drafters of the Convention, how-
ever, apparently seeking to avoid loopholes in Article 22, elected to
adopt a broad interpretation of mission inviolability. Therefore, the
Second Circuit properly concluded that under no circumstances
should mission inviolability be threatened. Nonetheless, this govern-
ment policy amounts to a taking of 767 Third Avenue Associates'
property which entitles the partnership to just compensation under
the Fifth Amendment.
B. The Takings Clause Requires the United States Government to
Fairly Compensate Landlords Affected by the Second
Circuit's Decision
The government's duty to protect property rights of United States
citizens is an important function of government. 126 When the Second
Circuit precluded 767 Third Avenue Associates from evicting the
Zairian mission, it effectively denied the partnership the power to
control its land, thus violating 767 Third Avenue Associates' property
rights. Accordingly, the partnership should have been compensated
124. Id. at 299 (quoting Report of the International Law Commission, Diplomatic Intercourse
and Immunities, U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 137, U.N. Doc. A/3623 (1957)).
125. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (discussing the rejected amendments to the
Vienna Convention which would have ameliorated the harsh impact of mission inviolability in
emergency situations).
126. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977).
[Vol. 45:165
1995] UNCOMPENSATED GOVERNMENTAL TAKING 183
under the Takings Clause. While the Second Circuit did not address
the takings issue, the district court Judge acknowledged that an evic-
tion order was necessary to prevent a governmental taking.127
As discussed in Part II.B., courts have found that a governmental
taking can occur when the government infringes on an individual's
contractual rights notwithstanding that no physical "taking" of the
property has occurred. 128 In 767 Third Avenue Associates, the Second
Circuit's holding results in a clear infringement upon the partnership's
contractual right to enforce the lease it entered into with the Republic
of Zaire. Specifically, the facts of 767 Third Avenue Associates satisfy
the three standards articulated by the Court in Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp.129 for determining whether a compensable
governmental taking has occurred.130
The first factor the Connolly court considered was the extent to
which the regulations interfered with the property owner's invest-
ment-backed expectations. In this case, the partnership's investment-
backed expectations consisted of receiving rent from Zaire in ex-
change for Zaire's use of its premises.' 3' The partnership sought
Zaire's eviction upon the Mission's failure to satisfy its rental obliga-
tions.132 Although its rental payments were long past due, Zaire con-
tinued to occupy the premises without compensating 767 Third
Avenue Associates for such use.133 By refusing to allow the partner-
ship to evict Zaire or relet the premises, the government significantly
interfered with 767 Third Avenue Associates' opportunity to gain a
return on the time, money and resources that it had invested in the
rental premises.
The second factor considered by the Connolly court was the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant. In 767 Third Avenue
Associates, the partnership suffered a significant economic loss as a
127. Brief for Appellee at 6, 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Permanent Mission of the Rep. of
Zaire, 988 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 92-7184).
[The district court judge] found that it would be manifestly inequitable to impose the
entire burden of the executive branch's asserted foreign policy objectives "on the shoul-
ders of a single private landlord." As [the district court judge] stated, "any other con-
clusion would raise a serious issue as to whether Plaintiffs had been subjected to an
unconstitutional 'taking' under the Fifth Amendment."
Id.
128. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for a nonphys-
ical "taking" of a person's property).
129. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
130. See supra text accompanying note 33 (enumerating the three Connolly factors).
131. 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Permanent Mission of the Rep. of Zaire, 988 F.2d 295, 296 (2d




result of the court's decision. The fact that the court awarded the
partnership monetary damages is of little consequence, since, as the
Second Circuit noted, Zaire was suffering from extreme economic dif-
ficulty. 134 In fact, in 1993, when the case was first decided, the eco-
nomic situation in Zaire was so desperate that its embassy was
impoverished. 135 Zaire's diplomats were forced to use their spouses'
babysitting money to put food on their tables.136 At the same time,
however, the partnership was losing $19,500 per month in rental in-
come while Zaire remained in possession of the premises.137
Due to Zaire's unfortunate financial condition, little hope exists
that 767 Third Avenue Associates will ever be able to collect the dam-
ages that the court awarded.138 An award of monetary damages
promised little comfort to the partnership, which was confronted with
the harsh reality that it would never collect its judgment. Thus, the
negative economic impact of the Second Circuit's decision on the
partnership multiplied each day that the Mission continued its rent-
free occupation of the 767 Third Avenue premises.
The third standard articulated by the Connolly court is the extent of
the governmental action. Here, the doctrine of mission inviolability
gave the United States Government the authority to recognize the
diplomatic immunity of the Zairianrmission over the property rights of
the partnership. 139 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, how-
ever, specifically states that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation,' 140 regardless of authority to
act. Therefore, the substantial protections afforded the Mission under
the Vienna Convention must be tempered by the United States Gov-
ernment's duty to compensate the partnership for the taking of the
767 Third Avenue premises. By failing to order the government to
134. Id. at 297.
135. David Frum, Diplomatic Impunity, FORBES, Apr. 26, 1993, at 110.
136. Diplomats Pay the Price of Zaire's Economic Woes, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 10,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File. The Mission has not received its monthly
$12,000 to $15,000 stipend for more than two years. Id. Diplomats have gone without salaries
for months. Id. At least one diplomat had to depend on a local church for food assistance. Id.
Gas and water service to the mission have been cut off because bills have gone unpaid. Id. Paint
has peeled from the ceiling of the main reception room because of water damage, and has been
left littered on the grungy carpet. Id. The ceiling of a first-floor office collapsed and was never
repaired. Id.
137. Id.
138. Significantly, the United States government cut Zaire's foreign aid from $31 million in
1990 to $3.5 millon last year because of Zaire's nonpayment of international debts. Frum, supra
note 135, at 110.
139. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text (discussing the protection that the Vienna
Convention's broad interpretation of mission inviolability accords foreign diplomats).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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compensate the partnership for this taking, the Second Circuit forced
767 Third Avenue Associates to bear a "public burden which, in all
fairness and justice, should [have been] borne by the public as a
whole."141
C. The Second Circuit's Decision Arguably Prevented Serious
International Repercussions
If the United States had evicted Zaire, strong international reac-
tions quite possibly could have followed. This argument is supported
by an examination of past diplomatic incidents. In particular, when-
ever one country has taken legal action against another, the trend has
been that a second has responded with reciprocal measures. 142 For
example, when local officials in Glen Cove, New York, denied Soviet
diplomats access to the town's beaches, the Soviets retaliated against
the American mission in Moscow by rescinding the Embassy's beach
privileges at a nearby river. 43 Likewise, when Great Britain detained
the Nigerian airplane kidnappers planned to use, Nigeria responded
by detaining a commercial British Caledonian jet.'" As one commen-
tator stated: "In some countries it would be easy to trump up charges
against a diplomat or his family. That could lead to retaliation that
would get out of hand.' 45 Therefore, the fear of adverse foreign ac-
tion against United States ambassadors is not without merit, which
justifies the Second Circuit's concern that United States ambassadors
could possibly feel repercussions if it did not strictly honor Zaire's
mission inviolability.
In sum, although the Second Circuit's decision upheld the sound
international policy of liberal mission inviolability, a single American
property owner should not have been required to bear the entire bur-
den for the nation's international policy decisions. Governmental pol-
icy justifications do not distinguish the fact that the court's decision
allowing the Zairian mission to continue to occupy the premises rent
free constituted a governmental taking. Therefore, under the express
directive of the Fifth Amendment, the United States Government
should have provided 767 Third Avenue Associates with just
compensation.
141. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
142. Farhangi, supra note 2, at 1544.
143. Id. at 1544-45 n.142.
144. Id. at 1545.
145. Id. at 1545 n.142 (quoting David Newsome, director of the Institute for the Study of
Diplomacy at Georgetown University).
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IV. IMPACT
The benefits of mission inviolability are evident. Mission inviolabil-
ity facilitates transactions with foreign sovereigns and protects foreign
ambassadors. 146 As the Second Circuit recognized, however, in 767
Third Avenue Associates the burden of mission inviolability fell almost
exclusively on the private landlord, and not upon the public as a
whole.147 In addressing the issue of who should bear the economic
burden of Zaire's failure to satisfy its rental obligations, the Second
Circuit acknowledged that "[r]eforming the Vienna Convention may
well be a valid objective. But federal courts are an inappropriate fo-
rum to accomplish the amendment of a multilateral treaty to which
the United States is a party.' 148 Instead, the court asserted that such
changes are best left to Congress. 49 As a result, it is up to the legisla-
tive branch to amend the Vienna Convention to limit the application
of mission inviolability to protect landlords and to prevent property
discrimination against newly formed sovereigns.
The State Department, however, has refused to support any amend-
ment to the Vienna Convention. 50 For instance, in 1984, a subcom-
mittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on a bill
which would have amended the Vienna Convention to make it a fed-
eral crime for any foreign diplomats in the United States to use fire-
arms to commit a felony. 15' Nonetheless, Congress resisted taking
an active role in revising the Vienna Convention, adhering to the State
Department's policy disfavoring any amendment to the
Convention. 5 2
In 1987, Congress again debated a proposed amendment to the Vi-
enna Convention. This time, Senator Jesse Helms had introduced a
bill which would have amended key diplomatic provisions under the
Vienna Convention to make members of diplomatic missions other
than diplomatic agents or consular officers subject to "the criminal
146. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing the functional necessity
doctrine).
147. 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Permanent Mission of the Rep. of Zaire, 988 F.2d 295, 302 (2d
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 74 (1993).
148. Id.
149. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing the reluctance of the judicial and
executive branches to limit the application of mission inviolability).
150. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 35, at 166 (describing the State Department's negative
response to proposed legislative revisions to the Vienna Convention).
151. Id. (citing Firearm Felonies by Foreign Diplomats: Hearings on S. 2771 Before the Sub-
comm. on Security and Terrorism of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 68 (1984)
(statement of Sen. Denton)).
152. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 35, at 167 (acknowledging Congress's acceptance of the
State Department's position).
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jurisdiction of the United States ... for any crime of violence, ... for
drug trafficking, or for reckless driving or driving while intoxicated or
under the influence of alcohol or drugs."' 5 3 Congress voted not to
adopt the Helms bill in accordance with the State Department's rec-
ommendation that passage of the bill would have violated the Vienna
Convention and undermined long-standing international principles. 5 4
Beyond placing a public burden solely upon the shoulders of private
landlords, the Second Circuit's decision will also prejudice newly de-
veloping countries as they seek to establish foreign missions in the
United States. For instance, the 767 Third Avenues Associates deci-
sion will likely make American landlords less willing to enter into
lease agreements with foreign sovereigns. Assuming that landlords
are willing to enter into rental transactions with foreign states at all,
they may charge extraordinarily high rent to incorporate the risk that
a court may refuse to enforce the lease's rental covenant. Alterna-
tively, landlords may require foreign tenants to obtain a guarantor or
to provide collateral to secure the tenant's promise to pay rent. At
the same time, newly developing countries are increasingly seeking
more space for their diplomatic quarters.155 New York hosts the
world's largest consular corps. 156 At least eighteen new missions were
153. Id. (quoting S. 1437, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., (1987)).
154. Id. at 167. Great Britain follows a similar policy regarding amendment to the Vienna
Convention, reasoning that although deviation from the original Convention
"might make it easier to prevent existing abuses by a small minority of diplomatic
agents ... it would penalize the majority by exposing them to arbitrary harassment,
detention or other abuse by a host government, either in retaliation for acts by a send-
ing State or because the existing rules of conduct were no longer taken so seriously."
Id. at 176 (quoting House of Commons, First Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Ses-
sion 1984-85, The Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges, at app. 3). The British Diplo-
matic Service Personnel acknowledged the dangers inherent in amending the Vienna
Convention, stating that Great Britain is
"a stable country ruled by due process of law. Such will not be the case in all countries
where our diplomats serve, accompanied by their wives and families. The risks in-
volved in departing from a strict interpretation of the Vienna Convention seem to us
likely to fall disproportionately on our diplomats and their families and we would pre-
fer them not to be run."
Id. at 177 (quoting House of Commons, First Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Ses-
sion 1984-85, The Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges, at app. 4).
155. See Susan Scherreik, Demand of New, and Old, Nations Enlivens Market, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 1993, § 10, at 9 ("With the Breakup of the Soviet Union and its consequent ripple effect,
many new countries are searching for diplomatic quarters in New York City or expanding re-
cently acquired space."). For instance, the Ukraine is negotiating to purchase property in New
York City for its diplomats. Id. In addition, Estonia has more than doubled the space it had
occupied in New York City. Id. Similarly, Slovenia is using to four times the office space it had
initially procured in New York City. Id. Moreover, Croatia is searching for a location in New
York City in which to set up a consulate. Id.
156. Id.
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established in New York in 1992 alone.157 As one journalist re-
marked, "The last time the United Nations saw a similar surge in
membership was in the early 60's with the end of colonialism."'158
From a practical standpoint, the new nations that join the United
Nations must set up missions in New York City in which to house their
foreign diplomats. Due to severe economic problems in their home
countries, however, sufficient funds to do so are often unavailable. 59
These economic constraints thus force such fledgling countries to rent,
rather than purchase, their mission premises.' 60 The Second Circuit's
decision exacerbates these economic difficulties by creating a legiti-
mate fear that landlords will be less willing to enter into lease agree-
ments with newly-formed countries because they do not want to risk
suffering a fate similar to that of 767 Third Avenue Associates.' 6'
For example, in November, 1993, the Ukraine was able to negotiate
a $392,000 three-year lease with an option to buy only after an Ameri-
can foundation agreed to guarantee payment if the Ukraine failed to
meet its rental obligation.' 62 Unfortunately, many countries do not
possess the ability to secure such guarantors. 63 Nor can they supply
the collateral that landlords may now request. 164 Such restrictions
may preclude many nations from setting up diplomatic missions in the
United States, which will negatively impact American landlords by de-
priving them of rental income that they would have otherwise re-
ceived.' 65 Certainly, the drafters of the Vienna Convention did not
envision this harsh result when they adopted the liberal definition of
mission inviolability into Article 22 of the Convention.
VI. CONCLUSION
As long as foreign sovereigns interact, the need for diplomatic im-
munities will continue to exist. Diplomatic immunity has ensured an




160. Id. at 9.
161. Id. Mr. Moller, a counselor to the United States Mission to the United Nations, noted
that "[t]hese countries aren't established financially and landlords are concerned they won't
have recourse if a nation breaking a lease invokes diplomatic immunity." Id. He further stated
that "[t]he diplomatic community generally has a good record of paying, but the occasional story
about a deadbeat diplomat makes landlords nervous." Id.
162. Id. In this case, the guarantor was the Foundation in Support of Diplomatic Missions of
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essential minimum level of freedom and independence for sending
states' representatives and has enabled diplomats to safely work in
potentially hostile foreign environments. Nonetheless, the concern
for diplomatic efficiency should not override the constitutionally pro-
tected property rights of United States citizens. The United States
Government, in allowing the defense of mission inviolability to pre-
vent Zaire's eviction, effectively negated 767 Third Avenue Associ-
ates' control over their premises. To prevent similar injustices in the
future, the United States has two choices: 1) limit the scope of mission
inviolability by amending the Vienna Convention to protect the pri-
vate property interests of landlords; or 2) justly compensate private
citizens forced to bear the burden of a foreign sovereign's immunity
for the benefit of the public. Due to the international community's
reluctance to amend the Vienna Convention's mission inviolability
provisions, the most viable alternative appears to be payment of just
compensation under the Takings Clause.
An efficient, functioning government is a benefit that is shared by
every United States citizen. This public benefit should not, however,
be the burden of a single citizen. By compensating landlords like 767
Third Avenue Associates for the governmental taking of their prop-
erty, the burden will be shared equally by all United States citizens
because taxes will be used to compensate the partnership. The citi-
zenry therefore may or may not tolerate Zaire's free tenancy. If they
do not, their opinions will be heard by the legislature and the Vienna
Convention will likely be reformed - a result the appellate court in
767 Third Avenue Associates recommended. 166
David Foster Bartlett
166. 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Permanent Mission of the Rep. of Zaire, 988 F.2d 295, 302 (2d
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 74 (1993).

